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Abstract
This paper provides an alternative real options framework to assess how rms
strategic interaction under imperfect competition a¤ects the industrial dynamics of
investment, concentration, and expected returns. When rms have similar production
technologies, the cross sectional variation in expected returns is low, rmsinvestments
are more synchronized, rmsexpected returns co-move positively, and the industry
is less concentrated. Conversely, in more heterogeneous industries, the cross sectional
variation in expected returns is high, there are leaders and followers whose expected
returns co-move negatively, and the industry is more concentrated. The model rational-
izes several empirical facts, including: (i) that rmsreturns co-move more positively
in less concentrated industries; (ii) that booms and busts in industry returns are more
pronounced in less concentrated industries; and (iii) that less concentrated industries
earn higher returns on average.
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Introduction
While the investment based asset pricing literature motivated by Cochrane (1996), Berk,
Green and Naik (1999) and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004) predicts that rms
investment decisions a¤ect their exposure to systematic risk, few theoretical papers explore
how the organization of an industry a¤ects the conditional dynamics of rms expected
returns through its e¤ect on investment.1 Meanwhile, recent empirical ndings by Hou and
Robinson (2006) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) suggest that industrial organization has a
signicant impact on the cross section of expected returns. In less concentrated industries,
rmsreturns are higher on average; rmsreturns co-move more positively; and average
industry returns show a regular pattern of booms or periods of high investment and high
returns, followed by busts or periods of low investment and low returns.2
This paper proposes a dynamic model of investment under imperfect product market
competition whose asset pricing implications explain these empirical facts. The model
considers a real options framework in which rms with heterogeneous production technologies
compete in capacity. Each rm in the industry has a single growth option to increase its
capacity and decides when and how much to invest. As in Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino
(2004), the model predicts that the exposure to systematic risk or beta of any rm depends
on the relative contribution of its own growth opportunities to its value. In contrast with
Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004), however, in imperfectly competitive industries the
exposure to systematic risk of any rm also depends on the growth opportunities of its
competitors. Under imperfect competition, the expected returns of all rms in the industry
are mechanically interrelated.
The core prediction of the model is then that the industrial dynamics of expected returns
depend on the underlying distribution of rmscurrent and future production technologies.
When rms have more similar production technologies, rms are closer competitors whose
investments are more synchronized, and rms make similar additions to capacity upon in-
creases in market demand. This leads to less concentrated industries in which rmsexpected
returns co-move positively over time, and the dynamics of the expected returns of each rm
in particular are similar to those of the industry on average. Conversely, when rms have
more heterogeneous production technologies, rms with relatively more valuable investment
1These papers include Aguerrevere (2009) and Novy Marx (2010). I enlarge on related literature below.
2I elaborate on these empirical ndings below.
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opportunities invest signicantly earlier and more than other rms. This leads to more
concentrated industries in which the expected returns of leaders and followers co-move neg-
atively over time, and the dynamics of the expected returns of each rm in particular are
not representative of those of the industry on average.
The equilibrium dynamics of rms investment and expected returns under imperfect
competition coincide with those described in the real options literature for idle rms only
when rms have more similar production technologies. When rms are close competitors
and tacitly coordinate their investments, each rm expects an increase in its market share
upon option exercise. This is the same prediction by Dixit and Pyndick (1994) for idle
rms. The industry has a common investment threshold at which all rms nd it optimal
to increase their capacity; rmsbetas jointly increase before investment and decrease upon
option exercise. The real options prediction by Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004)
that a boom in a given rms beta before investment is followed by a bust upon investment
also holds on average at the industry level.
Conversely, in more heterogeneous industries with leaders and followers, whenever one
rm expects an increase in its market share upon its own investment, the remaining rms
expect a corresponding reduction in their own. The expected reduction in market share
due to future additions to industry capacity by competitors dampens the beta of any rm in
the same industry- yet this occurs at di¤erent points in time for each rm. When one rm
expects a decrease in its beta upon its own investment, the remaining rms expect an increase
in their own betas once their competitors invest. The industry has multiple investment
thresholds, the returns of leaders and followers co-move negatively, and the booms and busts
in rmsexpected returns are not easily observable on average at the industry level.
The testable implications rationalize the evidence on average industry returns and the
Herndahl Hirshman Index (HHI) of concentration.3 As in Hoberg and Phillips (2010), the
model predicts that rmsreturns co-move more positively in less concentrated industries.
The stylized real options prediction that a boom in a given rms beta before investment is
followed by a bust upon investment holds for average industry returns only in less concen-
trated industries. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) nd that less concentrated industries have
more predictable average returns, with periods of high investment and high returns followed
by periods of low investment and low returns. Finally, in more concentrated industries,
3The US Federal Trade Commission denes the HHI as the sum of the squares of the market shares of
the 50 largest rms within the industry.
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rmsbetas are dampened by the expected reduction in market share due to future addi-
tions to industry capacity. This result can explain the nding by Hou and Robinson (2006)
that less concentrated industries earn higher returns on average.
The model also yields testable implications on the relation between the cross sectional
variance of industrial returns and industry concentration. The industrial cross sectional
variance of returns is higher in more concentrated industries at any point in time. The
model predicts that the booms and busts in the industrial cross sectional variance of returns
are easily detectable irrespective of industry concentration. Furthermore, the model predicts
that the current industrial cross sectional variance in returns has predictability over the future
concentration of an industry. In particular, more heterogeneous industries with high cross
sectional variance in rmsbetas become highly concentrated.4
The model characterizes how the underlying determinants of market demand a¤ect the
industrial dynamics of investment, concentration and expected returns. In industries with
low demand elasticity, high demand growth, and high demand uncertainty, rms are more
likely to coordinate investments and have more similar investment policies.5 Such industries
are more likely to be less concentrated, have higher returns on average, have lower cross
sectional variance in returns, and have more predictable booms and busts. Since high demand
growth and volatility boost the value of rmsgrowth options, the framework explains why
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) nd more pronounced booms and busts in less concentrated
industries with high demand growth and high demand uncertainty.
Finally, the paper elaborates on the e¤ects of a higher number of competitors on industry
dynamics. In line with the evidence in Bulan, Mayer and Somerville (2009), and the results
in Grenadier (2002) and Aguerrevere (2009), increased competition erodes rms growth
option values and rms expected returns in all industries. This paper adds to these
studies as it shows that in industries with heterogeneous rms with higher installed capacity
and less productive growth opportunities are more severely hit by increased competition.6
The evidence in Bulan (2005) supports this prediction. The model also adds to Grenadier
(2002) as it shows that increased competition need not induce all rms to invest earlier
under imperfect competition. A higher number of competitors induces all rms in the same
industry to accelerate investment only if they are close competitors, but not necessarily
4The evidence in Alexander and Thistle (1999) relates to this last prediction.
5This is consistent with the industrial organization literature on tacit collusion. See Ivaldi et al (2003),
Motta (2004) and Boyer et al (2001).
6Grenadier (2002) and Aguerrevere (2009) consider symmetric oligopolies.
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otherwise.7
To summarize, the main contributions of the paper are three. First, the paper provides
an alternative real options framework which predicts how the organization of an industry
a¤ects rmsexposure to systematic risk by focusing on the e¤ects of strategic interaction
on rmsinvestment decisions. This is in contrast with the existing literature on industrial
investment, expected returns and concentration which, by construction, does not elaborate
on the equilibrium e¤ects of rmsstrategic interaction.8 Second, the paper yields several
testable implications on the relation between industry concentration and the industrial cross
section of returns. The model highlights that industry concentration is not only related
to average industry returns, but also to the industrial cross sectional variance of returns,
and to the co-movement in rmsexpected returns within the same industry. The third
more broader contribution is to bridge the gap between the investment based asset pricing
literature and the industrial organization literature.
The related literature includes studies in both nance and economics. The theme of the
paper is very closely related to Aguerrevere (2009), who applies a real options model of iden-
tical rms under imperfect competition to explain the evidence in Hou and Robinson (2006).
Using a di¤erent real options framework, Aguerrevere (2009) provides the conditional pre-
diction that less concentrated industries may earn higher returns on average if demand is
su¢ ciently high. This paper proposes the complementary explanation that in more con-
centrated industries rmsbetas are dampened by the expectation of future additions to
industry capacity.
The proposed real options framework is yet more closely related to Fundenberg and
Tirole (1985), Grenadier (1996), Weeds (2002) and Mason and Weeds (2010), who consider
alternative duopolies in which rms optimally decide when to invest. This paper explores
the asset pricing implications of a model in which multiple, heterogeneous rms decide when
and how much to invest. The model incorporates incentive compatibility constraints and
sorting conditions to endogeneize rmsincentives to deviate from their strategies, in line
with Maskin and Tirole (1988).9 The approach is consistent Back and Paulsen (2009), who
7This is because a higher number of competitors may induce rms to invest sequentially. See Section IV.
8Aguerrevere (2009) and Novy Marx (2010) consider industries in which rms invest continuously and
simultaneously at each point in time. In this paper, each rm has a single growth option and the ordering
of rmsinvestments is an equilibrium outcome.
9The implementation also relates to Bustamante (2011), who applies sorting conditions to a real options
game with multiple action strategies.
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require real option games of imperfect competition to account for rmsincentives to invest
sequentially or simultaneously.
The paper is also closely related to Carlson et al (2009), who predict in a Stackelberg
real options duopoly that the beta of the leader is dampened by the expectation of lower
future prots once the follower invests. Bena and Garlappi (2011) obtain a similar result in a
model of investment timing in R&D, and provide the supporting empirical evidence that race
leaders have lower systematic risk. This paper observes that the beta of any operating rm in
more concentrated industries is dampened by the expectation of future additions to industry
capacity. Boyer et al (2001), Grenadier (2002), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), Garlappi
(2004), Pawlina and Kort (2006), and Novy Marx (2010) consider alternative mechanisms
through which imperfect competition a¤ects rmsgrowth options and expected returns.
The paper is organized in ve sections. Section I denes rmsvalues, expected returns
and the industrial return moment conditions. Section II derives rmsinvestment strategies
in equilibrium. Section III provides the asset pricing implications. Section IV elaborates
on comparative statics. Section V concludes.
I Industrial organization and expected returns
A Main assumptions
Consider an industry with N rms. Each rm j = 1; 2; ::; N has both assets in place and a
growth option to invest and increase capacity. Each rm is all equity nanced and run by a
manager who is the single shareholder. Firms operate at full capacity at any point in time.
Firms compete in capacity and produce an homogeneous good which they sell in the
market at a price pt. The product demand function requires that the market price pt equals
pt = XtQ
  1
"
t (1)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of demand and Xt is a systematic multiplicative shock, and the
industry output Qt is the sum of the production at time t.10 The demand shock Xt follows
a geometric Brownian motion with drift , volatility  and X0 > 0:11
10Note that rms under imperfect competition do not operate in the range where " < 1:
11I further assume that Xo is strictly lower than any of the optimal thresholds derived in the paper. This
ensures that the value of rmsgrowth options is positive when they start operating.
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Denote q
j
the installed capacity of rm j before investing in its growth option, and qj
its total capacity after investment. Firmsoption to increase capacity by qj = qj   qj
is subject to a xed cost of investment I. The decision to invest is irreversible such that
qj > 0.12
Firms di¤er in their current production technologies, their future production technologies,
or both. This is reected in their instantaneous prot function jt at time t. Before
exercising its own growth option, the instantaneous prot of rm j is given by
 jt =
 
p t   cXt

q
j
(2)
where the superscript   denotes value before option exercise, and c reects an instantaneous
marginal cost of production. Hence rms may di¤er in their current production technologies
via q
j
.13 Upon investment, the instantaneous prots of rm j are given by
+jt =
 
p+t   cjXt

qj (3)
where the superscript + denotes value after option exercise. Hence rms may di¤er in their
future production technologies via cj < c.
Firms maximize rm value by choosing the optimal investment strategy  j  fxj; qjg.
The investment strategy  j combines a stopping rule specifying the critical value xj for the
stochastic demand shock Xt at which rm j invests, and the amount qj that rm j adds
to its existing capacity upon investment. I elaborate of rmsstrategies in equilibrium and
the industry equilibrium concept in Section II.
B Firmsvalues
Firmsvalues are given by the expected present value of their risky prots. To evaluate
prots, I assume the existence of a pricing kernel. Using the standard argument in Du¢ e
(1996), I construct a risk neutral probability measure under which the demand shock Xt
follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift r  and volatility , where  is a convenience
yield. The risk premium associated with the stochastic process Xt is given by     
(r   ) :
12The irreversibility of investment implies a commitment by rms not to adjust their capacity upon a
reduction in market prices.
13For the sake of tractability, the production cost c is not rm specic, and yet rms may di¤er in the
value of their assets in place since their installed capacities q
j
are rm specic.
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Denote by Vjt the value of rm j at time t for any investment strategy  j = fxj; qjg:
The valuation of rm j before option exercise contains two well known components. The
rst is the value of a growing perpetuity of cash ows generated by its assets in place. The
second is the value of its investment opportunities or growth options. This provides the
standard prediction in real options models that the value of rm j depends on its lifestage.14
The model allows for a third component which reects the impact of strategic interaction
on rm value. In imperfectly competitive industries, the value of rm j depends not only
on its own lifestage but also on the lifestage of its competitors. At any point in time, the
market price pt at which rm j sells its production depends the capacity decisions of all
rms in the industry. Before rm j invests, the capacity additions of its competitors reduce
current and future market prices, and hence lower the current and future prots of rm j.
After rm j invests, the instantaneous prots of rm j decrease if their competitors make
subsequent additions to capacity.
Denote jt the expected change in instantaneous prots of rm j due to subsequent
investments by other rms. The value of rm j for any investment strategy  j = fxj; qjg
is then given by
Vjt =
8><>:
 jt

+
 jt

+

+jt

+
+jt

  
 
jt


Xt=xj
  I

Xt
xj
v
if Xt 6 xj
+jt

+
+jt

if Xt > xj
(4)
where v > 1 is dened in the Appendix.
Expression (4) suggests that Vjt depends on rm js assets in place, its growth opportu-
nities, and the e¤ect of other rmsinvestment strategies before or after rm j exercises its
own growth option. The fact that each rms investment strategy a¤ects the value of its
competitors is reected in the terms  jt and 
+
jt. I characterize 
 
jt and 
+
jt explicitly
in Section II.
C Firmsexpected returns
Firms are subject to a single source of systematic risk given by the demand shock in (1).
Given that the riskless rate of return r is exogenously specied, the expected return of rm
j at time t equals
Rjt = r +  jt (5)
14See, for instance, Dixit and Pyndick (1994).
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where  is the market price of risk, and jt is the beta of rm j which reects the sensitivity
of Vjt to systematic risk. In line with other papers in the literature, the market price of risk
 is constant and exogenously given, and the dynamics of Rjt are driven by jt:
15
The paper studies the impact of imperfect competition on rmsexpected returns by
analyzing rmsbetas. To determine jt, I follow Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004)
and infer expected returns from replicating hedge portfolios composed of a risk free asset
and a risky asset that exactly reproduce the dynamics of rm value.16 The proportion of
the risky asset held in the replicating portfolio at any time t equals   @V
@X
X
V
: The beta of
rm j is then given by
jt = 1 + It (v   1)

1  1

jt
Vjt

(6)
where It is an indicator function which is equal to 0 if all rms have invested at time t and
is equal to 1 otherwise.
Equation (6) highlights the importance of imperfect competition on rmsexposure to
systematic risk. Firms relative market power a¤ects prot margins and hence their betas.
In less competitive industries, rms equate marginal income to marginal costs, rms in-
stantaneous prots are strictly positive, and their betas are strictly lower than v > 1 before
investment. In more competitive industries, instantaneous prots are closer to zero, and
rmsbetas are closer to v before investment. In the extreme case of perfectly competitive
industries, instantaneous prots equal zero, there is no option value of waiting to invest and
rmsbetas are always equal to 1.
Equation (6) is also consistent with the prediction by Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino
(2004) for idle rms that the exposure to systematic risk of a rm depends on the relative
contribution of its own growth opportunities to total rm value. In contrast with Carlson,
Fisher and Giammarino (2004), however, jt also depends on the growth opportunities of
all other rms in the industry. This is because both the current assets in place of rm j
and its future value depend on the market share of rm j over time. The expected returns
of all rms in the industry are interrelated due to rmsstrategic interaction.
Finally, denote the Lerner index of rm j by ljt and the market share of rm j at time t
by sjt. Reordering terms in (6), it is straightforward to show that jt equals
jt = 1 + It (v   1)

1  ljt  sjt  1

ptQt
Vjt

(7)
15See, for instance, Berk, Green and Naik (1999) and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004).
16See the proof of Proposition 2 in Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004).
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Equation (7) predicts that jt depends mechanically on rm js Lerner index, its current
market share, and its current size relative to that of the product market. This is consistent
with the static industrial organization literature on rmsbetas and imperfect competition.17
In contrast with this literature, however, (7) shows that rmsbetas depend on both on
rmscurrent and future relative market power.18 Pyndick (1985) already highlights the
importance of rmsfuture investment opportunities when measuring their market power.
Proposition 1 Under imperfect product market competition, the exposure to systematic risk
of each rm jt depends on the relative contribution of growth opportunities to rm value
of all rms in the industry.
D Industry expected returns
The identities for jt yield expressions for the industrial expected return moment conditions.
Denote the average industry beta by ;t. Then (6) and (7) imply that at any time t the
average industry beta depends mechanically on rmsaverage prot margins, market shares
and relative growth opportunities.
More interestingly, the model characterizes the industrial cross sectional variation of
expected returns ;t. Notice that in industries in which rms are identical there is no cross
sectional variation in expected returns. In industries where rms di¤er in their production
technologies, however, the model predicts that there is cross sectional variation in expected
returns such that
;t = It (v   1) 1

 
V
;t (8)
Equation (8) implies that the cross sectional di¤erences in rmsproduction technologies
a¤ect mechanically the industrial cross section of returns. While the literature provides
investment based explanations on the cross section of expected returns on aggregate,19 equa-
tion (8) relates rmsinvestment policies to the industrial cross section of expected returns,
and highlights that ;t is a¤ected by rmsstrategic interaction.
Finally, note that the model provides an alternative expression for ;t such that
;t = It (v   1) (pQ)

( ls
V
)2;t   2l
V
;t
2s;t   2s;t

2ls
V
;t
2l
V
;t
  2l;ts;t
 ls
V
;t l
V
;t
s;t
 1
2
(9)
17See, for instance, Alexander and Thistle (1999).
18This is because Vjt also depends on rmsfuture production technologies.
19See Cochrane (1996), Berk, Green and Naik (1999) and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004).
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where  ls
V
;t denotes the correlation between
ljt
Vjt
and sjt. Equation (9) then shows that
;t depends on rmsLerner indexes, market shares, and relative growth opportunities.
In particular, (9) provides the novel prediction that the industrial cross section of returns
depends on industry concentration. Note that the term 2s;t in (9) relates by construction to
the HHI, which measures industry concentration and is the sum of the squares of the market
shares of all rms in the industry.
In sum, equations (6)-(9) show that the organization of a given industry a¤ects its dis-
tribution of returns over time. This important result obtains under the sole assumptions of
investment under uncertainty, imperfect competition and heterogeneity in rmsproduction
technologies.
II Equilibrium investment strategies
Section I provides identities for the industrial return moment conditions which stem di-
rectly from the assumptions of imperfect competition in capacity and the cross sectional
di¤erences in rmsproduction technologies. These identities, however, hold for any set of
investment strategies and hence do not provide any equilibrium implication about the exact
relation between an industrys organization, its investments and expected returns over time.
This section characterizes rmsinvestment strategies in equilibrium. I elaborate on the
equilibrium asset pricing implications of these strategies in Section III.
Firms optimal investment strategies are such that rms maximize value by choosing
the investment threshold xj and the increase in capacity qj. At each point in time, the
state of the industry is described by the history of the stochastic demand shock Xt. At
any point in time t, a history is the collection of realizations of the stochastic process Xs,
s 6 t and the actions taken by all rms in the industry until time t. Hence the investment
strategy  j maps the set of histories of the industry into the set of actions fxj; qjg for rm
j. Before investment, rm j responds immediately to its competitorsinvestment decisions.
This yields Nash equilibria in state dependent strategies of the closed-loop type. Upon
investment, rm j cannot take any other action.
Firms follow Markov strategies such that their actions are functions of the current state
Xt only. As discussed in Weeds (2002), other non-Markov strategies may also exist; however,
if one rms follows a Markov strategy, the best response of the other rm is also Markov.20
20See Fundenberg and Tirole (2001) and Weeds (2002) for a discussion on this point.
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Furthermore, I consider the set of subgame perfect equilibria in which each rms investment
strategy, conditional on its competitors strategy, is value maximizing. A set of strategies
that satises this condition is Markov perfect. The initial demand shock X0 is su¢ ciently
low to focus on equilibria in pure strategies.21
In a nutshell, the section shows that rmsrelative di¤erences in current and future pro-
duction technologies predetermine the ordering and magnitude of their investment strategies
in Markov perfect equilibria. The distribution of rms production technologies presets
whether industries are less or more concentrated, and whether rmsprot margins co-move
positively or negatively over time. To ease on exposition, I focus on the main predictions
of the model for the specic case of a duopoly in which rms which have the same installed
capacities and di¤erent future production technologies. The qualitative results for this spe-
cic case apply to the more general case in which rms di¤er in their current and future
technologies. I discuss the more general case in the Appendix.
A Markov perfect equilibria
Consider a rm L and another rm F which have the same installed capacity q but di¤er in
their future production technologies such that cL < cF : Subgame perfection requires that
each rms strategy maximizes its value conditional on its competitors strategy. Anticipat-
ing, there are two possible Markov perfect industry equilibria with N = 2: a simultaneous
equilibrium in which rms invest simultaneously and the industry is less concentrated, and a
sequential equilibrium with leaders and followers and the industry is more concentrated. The
type of equilibrium that emerges depends on how rm Ls value under sequential investment
compares with the value of the simultaneous investment strategy.
Firmsvalues are given by (4), and yet the exact formula for jt depends on whether
rms invest simultaneously or sequentially in equilibrium. Denote  cj the investment strategy
of rm j in the simultaneous equilibrium. Under simultaneous investment, rmsvalues are
given by (4) with cjt  0. Hence strategic interaction does not a¤ect the dynamics of
rmsvalues in equilibrium. Denote  sj the investment strategy of rm j in the sequential
equilibrium. When rms invest sequentially, the model predicts sjt 6 0 since both rms
21When rms are identical, the equilibrium may involve mixed strategies, whose formulation is complicated
by the continuous time nature of the game, as observed in Fundenberg and Tirole (1985) and Weeds (2002).
When rms have di¤erent production technologies, however, a su¢ cient assumption to avoid these concerns
is that X0 is su¢ ciently low such that X0 < xsL: See Mason and Weeds (2010).
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expect a reduction in prots at di¤erent points in time.22 Hence strategic interaction has
equilibrium e¤ects on rmsvalues when rms invest sequentially.
The sorting conditions of the game suggest that the ordering and magnitude of rmsin-
vestment decisions in equilibrium are essentially determined by the value maximizing strategy
for the more e¢ cient rm L. I prove in the Appendix the sorting condition of the multiple
action strategy fxj; qjg is such that more e¢ cient rms nd it less costly to invest earlier
and more, namely
@
@cj
h
@Vj
@xj
i
> 0; @
@cj
h
@Vj
@qj
i
< 0 (10)
The sorting conditions in (10) have important implications for rmsstrategic behavior.
First, since rm L has a comparative advantage to invest earlier and more, rm F does not
become a leader in equilibrium even if it has incentives to preempt rm L. This implies that
rm L is the only potential leader if rms invest sequentially in equilibrium. Second, if rm
L does not have an incentive to become a leader, neither does rm F , whose ability to invest
earlier and more is comparatively lower. This implies that both rms invest simultaneously
if rm L has incentives to do so.23
In sum, the model predicts that rm L has the real option to become a leader, and rm
L exercises this option only if the early monopoly rents acquired as a leader are relatively
higher than the shadow cost of preventing rm F to invest earlier. Firm L becomes a
leader when rm F is not a close competitor, such that c  cF   cL is larger than some
lower bound c. Hence the industry has leaders and followers and are more concentrated if
c > c, whereas rms invest simultaneously and the industry is less concentrated if c 6 c.
I elaborate on these predictions below.
A.1 Sequential equilibrium
Consider rst the sequential equilibrium in which the more e¢ cient rm L invests earlier
and more, and the less e¢ cient rm F invests later and less. This result resembles that
of Stackelberg games.24 In contrast with these games, however, the sequential ordering of
investment decisions is an equilibrium outcome.
22I characterize sjt below.
23I elaborate on this in the Appendix.
24Note that the referred Stackelberg games include the real option frameworks that take as given the
ordering of rmsinvestment decisions. These include Trigeorgis (1986) and Carlson et al (2009).
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To obtain the ordering of rmsinvestment decisions endogenously, consider the incentives
to both rms to become leaders. Sequential equilibria occur when rm L has incentives
to lead such that c > c.25 Meanwhile, rm F has incentives to lead whenever the early
monopoly rents obtained as a leader are higher than the implied cost of investing earlier with
a less e¢ cient technology. Denote  j the strategy of rm j in a Stackelberg game in which
rm L invests rst. Firm F has incentives to preempt rm L wheneverfVF 
Xt=xL
> V F jXt=xL (11)
where eVj indicates deviation in both timing and capacity for j = L; F .26 I assume that (11)
holds throughout the paper.27
Consider the equilibrium strategy  sF chosen by rm F when rm L invests earlier. Using
the approach in Dixit and Pyndick (1994), the optimal investment threshold xsF equals
xsF =
I v
1 vh
(Qs) 
1
"   cF
i
qsF  
h 
q + qsL
  1
"   c
i
q
(12)
where Qs  qsL + qsF . Meanwhile, rm F maximizes its capacity qsF such that
cF = (Q
s) 
1
"

1  1
"
qsF
Qs

(13)
Conditions (12) and (13) reect that rm F invests later and less if rm L has a larger
capacity qL:
Consider now the equilibrium strategy of the leading rm  sL. Given (11), rm L
maximizes its value subject to the additional complementary slackness condition

h
V sF   fV sFi
Xt=xsL
= 0 (14)
where the Lagrange multiplier  > 0 reects the shadow cost of preemption for rm L.28
The Lagrange multiplier  therefore relates to Posner (1975) and measures to what extent
25I prove this formally later on.
26Due to the sorting conditions, the strategy to deviate in timing only is dominated by the strategy to
deviate in both timing and capacity.
27Condition (11) provides an upper bound c such that rm F has no incentives to preempt rm L if
c > c. Firmsoptimal equilibrium strategies when c > c correspond to those of a standard Stackelberg
game in which rm L invests rst, namely  j   sj ( = 0). The core implications of this paper yet relate
to the equilibrium e¤ects of rmsstrategic behavior when c  c: I thus assume c > c for simplicity.
28The solution approach relates to Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Bustamante (2011).
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the contest for monopoly power hinders the early monopoly prots of rm L. The sorting
conditions ensure that (14) is binding when (11) holds.29
I show in the Appendix that the investment threshold xsL that solves the constrained
optimization problem of rm L is then given by
xsL =
I v
1 vh 
q + qsL
  1
" qsL   'cL
i
qsL  
h 
2q
  1
"   c
i
q
(15)
where ' = cL cF
cL(1 ) < 1. In line with Dixit and Pyndick (1994), the optimal investment
threshold in (15) is the ratio between the xed cost of investment I and the present value of
the expected net prots from increasing capacity, adjusted for the option value of waiting to
invest v
1 v . Meanwhile, the optimal capacity q
s
L for rm L satises
(1  s)  1  1
"

xsL
 
qL + q
  1
" +sxsL (Q
s) 
1
"
h
1  1
"
qsL
Qs

1 +
@qsF
@qL
i
+ s (1  v)

@xsF
@qL
qsL
xsF

xsL
h
(Qs) 
1
"    qsL + q  1" i ='cLxsL (16)
where all prices are evaluated at xsL such that 
s =

xsL
xsF
v 1
. The right hand side of (16)
reects the marginal benets of increasing capacity. Firm Lmay increase its monopoly rents,
and may deter rm Fs investment by either reducing its future market share or inducing
F to invest later. The left hand side of (16) reects rm Ls marginal costs of increasing
capacity.
Notably, both (15) and (16) reect that the net gains from investment are subject to
the shadow cost of preemption  > 0. The shadow cost of preemption  > 0 makes rm
L behave as if it had a lower production cost since 'cL < cL. The denominator in (15)
is increasing in , since rm L behaves more aggressively to secure its position as a leader.
Equation (16) also reects how rm Ls optimal capacity choice is a¤ected by its strategic
concerns. Firm L determines its optimal capacity as if it were more e¢ cient since 'cL <
cL:
Finally, recall the expected reductions in protsjt dened in Section I. These expected
reductions in prots capture the impact of strategic interaction on rmsvalues in equilib-
rium. When rms invest sequentially, rmsexpected reductions in prots are such that
sjt  0. The equilibrium ordering of capacity additions implies s+F;t = 0 and s L;t = 0:
29See Appendix for the derivation of the sorting conditions.
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Firm F experiences a reduction in market prices once rm L invests adds capacity. The
expected reduction in instantaneous prots s F;t is then
s Ft =
h 
qsL + q
  1
"    2q  1" ixsLqXtxsL
v
< 0 (17)
for Xt 6 xsL. Firm L also expects a reduction in market prices once rm F adds capacity.
The corresponding reduction in instantaneous prots s+L;t yields
s+L;t =
h
Q 
1
"    qsL + q  1" ixsF qsLXtxsF
v
< 0 (18)
for xsL < Xt 6 xsF : Table I illustrates numerically rmsexpected reductions in prots sjt
at Xt = X0.
A.2 Simultaneous equilibrium
The simultaneous equilibrium of an industry with N = 2 is such that both rms invest at
the investment threshold of rm L, and rmscapacity increases are analogous to those of
Cournot duopolies. In contrast with Cournot games, however, the simultaneous equilibrium
obtains in a real options set-up in which both rms attain a higher value by coordinating
their investments.30
To see this, consider the stage in which neither rm has invested, and assume further that
the leader optimizes value by investing simultaneously since c < c: The sorting conditions
in (10) imply that if rm L attains a higher value under simultaneous investment, so does
rm F , whose ability to lead is relatively less protable. I show in the Appendix that for
any set of sequential and simultaneous strategies, if rm L prefers simultaneous investment,
rm F also does. Hence both rms nd it more protable to invest simultaneously when
c < c:
31
Consider then the equilibrium investment strategies  cj. The rst order condition on V
c
j
for the optimal capacity qcj of rm j when rms invest simultaneously yields
cj = (Q
c) 
1
"

1  1
"
qcj
Qc

(19)
30This is in line with Weeds (2002) and Mason and Weeds (2010).
31Both Fundenberg and Tirole (1985) and Weeds (2002) argue that if one equilibrium Pareto-dominates
all others, it is the most reasonable outcome to expect. This is the case when c < c:
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which is independent of the demand threshold xc: The system of equations implied by (19)
for both rms determines the equilibrium quantities qcL and q
c
F irrespective of the choice of
xc.32
Given the asymmetry in rmsproduction technologies, each rm strictly maximizes its
value at di¤erent investment thresholds. In principle, this would yield a range of potential
equilibrium thresholds xc. The lowest demand threshold xc would correspond to that of
the more e¢ cient rm L; conversely, the upper bound xc would correspond to the optimal
demand threshold for the less e¢ cient rm F . However, rm L has no incentives to wait
further than its own optimal threshold xc: Meanwhile, rm F still has incentives to invest
at xc not to become a follower. The equilibrium investment threshold xc for all rms in the
industry is then
xc =
I v
1 vh
(Qc) 
1
"   cL
i
qcL  
h 
2q
  1
"   c
i
q
(20)
which is the optimal demand threshold for rm L given the capacity choices in (19).
Table I illustrates the equilibrium investment strategies  cj numerically. In the simulta-
neous equilibrium, rm L invests more and attains a higher value than rm F . This is in line
with Cournot games and reects the asymmetry in production technologies between both
rms. Table I shows that when rms invest simultaneously industries are less concentrated
than when rms invest sequentially. Compared to sequential equilibria, rm L invests later
and less (i.e. xsL < x
c
L and q
c
L < q
s
L), while rm F invests earlier and more (i.e. x
c
L < x
s
L and
qsL < q
c
L). Finally, note that in Table I the expected reduction in prots 
c
jt equals zero for
all rms at any point in time. This is because rms invest simultaneously in equilibrium.
B Equilibrium outcome
To fully characterize the equilibrium outcome, consider the incentives of rm L to invest
sequentially or simultaneously. Firm L may become a market leader, enjoy early monopoly
rents and yet pay the shadow cost of preemption. Alternatively, rm L may allow the
follower to invest simultaneously, attain lower duopoly rents from the start and yet avoid
any cost of preemption. Firm L0s real option to become a leader is therefore given by
V maxL jXt=xsL = max
n
V sL jXt=xsL ; V
c
L jXt=xsL
o
(21)
32This is because rmsinstantaneous prots are linear in qj . The equilibrium capacity choices implied
by (19) are hence comparable to those which obtain in Cournot duopolies.
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where (21) is evaluated at xsl since the sequential equilibrium requires earlier exercise (i.e.
xsl < x
c).33 The lower bound c at which rm L is indi¤erent between leading and clustering
obtains when V sL = V
c
L at Xt = x
s
L:
In sum, there are two subgame perfect industry equilibria depending on the dispersion
in rmsproduction technologies c. When c < c, rms are close competitors, neither
rm has incentives to lead, and a simultaneous equilibrium obtains in which rms invest
simultaneously and the industry is less concentrated. When c > c and rms are more
distant competitors, rm L has incentives to lead, and a sequential equilibrium emerges in
which rm L becomes the leader and the industry is less concentrated. Firm F 0s incentives
to lead determine the magnitude of the shadow cost of preemption  on rm L.
Table I and Figure 1 illustrate these predictions numerically. Table I compares the
sequential and simultaneous equilibria for the same c. In the example, rm L attains a
higher value in the simultaneous investment since c < c, and rms invest simultaneously in
equilibrium. Figure 1 compares rm values in equilibrium as a function of c: While rm F
is always better o¤ in the simultaneous equilibrium, rm L is better o¤ under simultaneous
investment when c is low. Concentration upon investment is higher in sequential equilibria.
The shadow cost of preemption  decreases with c.
More importantly, rmsinvestment strategies in equilibrium predict how the underlying
distribution of rmsproduction technologies c a¤ects the dynamics of rmsprots over
time. When c < c, both rms add capacity simultaneously and strategic interaction
has no equilibrium e¤ects since cjt = 0. When c > c, rms invest sequentially and
strategic interaction a¤ects rmsprots in equilibrium since sjt  0. Each rm expects
a reduction in its prots precisely when its competitor invests and increases its own. These
dynamics have important asset pricing implications which I discuss in Section III.
Proposition 2 The subgame perfect industry equilibrium of the model is such that rms
follow strategies  cj if c < c and  
s
j otherwise, and hence
 When c < c, rms invest simultaneously, the industry is less concentrated, and
cjt = 0;
33Note that rm L always chooses between the sequential equilibrium that maximizes its value and the
simultaneous equilibrium in which all rms invest at the optimal.threshold for rm L. All other equilibria
are dominated for rm L.
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 When c > c, industries have leaders and followers, are highly concentrated, and
sjt  0.
I show in the Appendix that the qualitative predictions of Proposition 2 also apply to the
more general case in which rm type is given by both q
j
and cj: In imperfectly competitive
industries with heterogeneous rms, rms with lower installed capacity q
j
and lower future
costs of production cj have a comparative advantage to invest earlier and more than other
rms.34
III Equilibrium expected returns
This section shows how the equilibrium investment strategies described so far serve as an
input to obtain testable predictions on how rmsstrategic interaction in imperfectly com-
petitive industries a¤ect their exposure to systematic risk. The asset pricing implications
rationalize the recent empirical evidence by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Hou and Robin-
son (2006).
As a remark, note that Section II characterizes rmsinvestment dynamics in imperfectly
competitive industries for the special case of N = 2. A natural question to ask is whether
these results also hold in a more general framework with N rms. Concentration measures
such as the HHI depend both on the cross sectional di¤erences in market shares and the
number of rms in the industry.
The number of rms N inuences the equilibrium outcome. When N > 2, some rms
within the same industry may invest sequentially, while some others may cluster instead.
However, Table II illustrates that the relevant takeaways of Section II still hold for the case
of N > 2 rms.35 Firms invest simultaneously if they are close competitors, and indus-
tries have leading rms which invest earlier otherwise. Whenever rms invest sequentially,
concentration is higher, and all rms expect a reduction in their prots due to increases in
capacity by their competitors.
To ease on exposition, I focus on the asset pricing implications for the case of N = 2
to elaborate on the relation between the industrial cross section of returns and concentra-
tion. The case of N = 2 associates more (less) concentrated industries with industries
34See Appendix for discussion.
35See Appendix for discussion.
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with high (low) heterogeneity in production technologies in which rms invest sequentially
(simultaneously). I provide the comparative statics for N > 2 in Section IV.
A Expected returnsdynamics and co-movement
In the same way in which the dynamics of investment are di¤erent in less and more concen-
trated industries, the dynamics of rmsexpected returns also di¤er. In more homogeneous
industries in which rms invest simultaneously, rmsbetas co-move positively. Conversely,
in more heterogeneous industries, the betas of leaders and followers co-move negatively.36
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) provide the corresponding empirical evidence on this result, as
they nd that rmsreturns co-move more positively in industries with lower HHI.
To understand the mechanism behind this prediction, consider rst the dynamics of rms
betas jt when c < c. In less concentrated industries in which rms invest simultaneously,
the value of each rm is larger than the value of its assets in place before investment, and
equal to the value of its assets in place thereafter. This implies that cjt is higher than one
before investment and equal to one thereafter. Figure 2 illustrates this result for the case
of c = c:
More importantly, the dynamics of jt in less concentrated industries are in line with those
that obtain in a more standard real options set ups in which rms do not invest strategically,
since cjt  0.37 In both cases, rmsbetas reect whether their own investment option is
in the money. Strategic interaction has no equilibrium e¤ects on the industrys dynamics
when rms are close competitors, and hence cjt behaves as if rm j were an idle rm.
Consider now the dynamics of jt when c > c. In more concentrated industries with
leaders and followers, the equilibrium e¤ect of strategic interaction on rmsprots is such
that sjt 6 0 at di¤erent points in time. Whenever one rm expects to improve its prot
margin and market share upon investment, the other rm expects a reduction in its own due
to the capacity addition by its competitor. Hence rmsbetas co-move negatively in more
concentrated industries.
The predicted dynamics of sLt in more concentrated industries are consistent with those
36As a remark, note that in the general case of more concentrated industries with N rms, the betas of
leaders and followers comove negatively over time. However, the betas of all rms in general only comove less
positively (instead of negatively) since the betas of various followers may comove positively once a leading
rm invests.
37See Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004).
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of the leading rm in Carlson et al (2009) and Bena and Garlappi (2011). Before investment,
sLt is higher than one and higher than that 
s
F t since the growth option of rm L is more
valuable. Upon investment, however, the leader becomes a mature rm which expects a
reduction sLt < 0 in its future prots. This pushes 
s
Lt below one and below 
s
F t until all
rms exercise their growth option.
This paper adds to the literature as it observes that the beta of any operating rm in
more concentrated industries is dampened by the expectation of future additions to industry
capacity. In duopolies, strategic interaction a¤ects both the dynamics of sLt and 
s
F t in
equilibrium. Since both rms are already operating in the industry before rm L invests,
rm F also expects a reduction in prots sF t < 0 up until rm L invests. Figure 2
shows how this expected reduction in the future prots by rm F a¤ects the dynamics of
its expected returns. In particular, sF t is lower than one until rm L invests and higher or
equal to one thereafter.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium dynamics of rms betas under imperfect competition de-
pend on c such that
 When c < c, industries are less concentrated and rmsbetas co-move positively;
 When c > c; industries are more concentrated and the betas of leaders and followers
co-move negatively.
B Average industry expected returns
The model characterizes the relation between average industry expected returns ;t and
industry concentration. Consider rst the case of less concentrated industries. When
c < c, rms are close competitors and strategic interaction has no equilibrium e¤ects on
the dynamics of rmsbetas. In line with other real options models with idle rms, rms
betas are all higher than one before investment and lower than one thereafter. Hence the
average industry expected return is such that c;t > 1 for Xt 6 xc and c;t = 1 thereafter.
In contrast, in more concentrated industries strategic interaction does a¤ect the equilib-
rium dynamics of rmsbetas, and rmsbetas co-move negatively over time. The average
industry beta s;t is pushed down by the expectation of a future reduction in prots by
either rm F (up to Xt 6 xsL) or rm L (up to Xt 6 xsF ). The degree to which these
expected reductions in prots push the equally weighted average industry return s;t below
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one depends on parameter values. However, the value weighted average industry return is
such that s;t < 1 until all rms invest, and 
s
;t = 1 thereafter.
38
The result that the value weighted average expected returns of more concentrated indus-
tries c;t > 1 are lower than those of less concentrated industries s;t 6 1 provides a rationale
to the nding by Hou and Robinson (2006) that less concentrated industries earn higher re-
turns on average. Figure 3 illustrates this result numerically. The premium ct   st is
strictly positive up Xt = xc using any type of weights, and is strictly positive until all rms
invest in both industries using value weights. The mechanism relies on the equilibrium
e¤ects of strategic interaction.
In more concentrated industries, rmsexpected reduction in prots due to future addi-
tions to industry capacity pushes the average industry return downwards. Meanwhile, in
less concentrated industries, there is no such expectation. Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics
of s;t for N = 2 and c = c. Whenever the growth opportunity of one rm becomes more
in the money, the beta of this rm increases, whereas the beta of its competitor decreases
due to the corresponding expected reduction in prots upon investment. This second e¤ect
has always a relatively larger impact on the value weighted s;t.
39
The model therefore provides an alternative rationale to the nding by Hou and Robinson
(2006) relative to that proposed by Aguerrevere (2009). Aguerrevere (2009) derives the asset
pricing implications of an investment model of oligopoly in which all rms are identical, and
invest continuously and simultaneously at any point in time. Aguerrevere (2009) provides
the conditional prediction that less concentrated industries earn higher returns if market
demand is su¢ ciently low.40 In contrast, this paper explores industries with a cross section
of rms which decide when and how much to invest, and highlights that in more concentrated
industries the industrial average beta is lower due to rmsstrategic interaction.
Proposition 4 In more concentrated industries, rmsbetas are dampened by the expecta-
tion of reduced prots due to future additions to industry capacity. Hence more concentrated
industries may earn lower returns on average than less concentrated industries.
38I prove that s;t < 1 until Xt = x
s
F using value weights in the Appendix.
39The expected reduction in prices by rm L when rm F invests pushes s;t downwards since rm L has
much more installed capacity than rm F . Similarly, the expected reduction in prices by rm F when rm
L invests pushes s;t downwards since rm L expects to operate with low prices and low installed capacity
for a long period of time.
40Note that this nding also implies that more competitive industries earn higher returns during recessions.
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) interpret the result in Aguerrevere (2009) as a time series implication.
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C Industry booms and busts
The dynamics of rmsexpected returns are such that rms undergo periods of high expected
returns before exercising their own investment opportunity, and periods of low expected
returns after exercising their option. This prediction is consistent with Carlson, Fisher
and Giammarino (2004). This paper adds to Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004) as it
shows that these patterns are more easily observable on average at the industry level in less
concentrated industries.
Consider rst the case of less concentrated industries in which c < c: When rms
coordinate their investments in equilibrium, c;t follows the pattern of high expected returns
before all rms invest and low expected returns thereafter. The threshold xc constitutes
a common reference point for all rms in the industry at which they trigger their invest-
ments. As a consequence, the average returns of the industry decrease simultaneously upon
investment. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
Denote by j;t  1N
P
j
+jt    jt the equally weighted average change in industry betas
at time t. When rms invest simultaneously, the model predicts a decrease in the returns
of each rm j when the growth options of all rms in the industry become assets in place.
This implies
c;t

Xt=xc
= 1  1
N
X
j
c jt < 0 (22)
since c jt < 1.
Consider now the more concentrated industries in which c > c. When rms invest
sequentially, rmsbetas are negatively correlated, and booms and busts are rm-specic.
The industry has multiple investment thresholds at which rms add capacity, and all of these
thresholds matter in explaining the dynamics of s;t: At Xt = x
s
L, rm L invests, its growth
option becomes assets in place, and hence sLt decreases. Meanwhile, the growth option if
rm F becomes more valuable once it no longer expects a reduction in prots, such that sF t
increases. Conversely, at Xt = xsF , rm F invests and 
s
F t decreases, whereas 
s
Lt increases
up to 1 as rm L no longer expects a reduction in prots.
The actual sign of the discrete changes in s;t upon investment is illustrated in Figure
4. Using equally weighted average industry betas, the sign of s;t at x
s
L is positive and
the sign of s;t at x
s
F is negative. Hence the econometrician would only identify 
s
;t
at xsF as a bust. In more concentrated industries, x
s
F is the only investment threshold at
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which boom or period of high average valuation is followed a bust or decrease in s;t once
rm F invests.41 Figure 4 further illustrates that the magnitude of the bust in s;t at x
s
F
is strictly smaller than that of c;t at x
c This is because rmsbetas co-move negatively
in less concentrated industries.
The empirical evidence in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) is highly consistent with the predic-
tions of the model on the dynamics of expected returns. The model predicts that the discrete
change in the average industry returns is easily observable to the econometrician since rms
expected returns co-move positively in equilibrium. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) nd that
less concentrated industries have more predictable average industry returns, with periods of
high valuation, high expected returns and high investment or booms are followed by periods
of lower valuation and lower expected returns or busts.42 They also nd no signicant booms
and busts in the average industry returns of highly concentrated industries.
Proposition 5 The stylized real options prediction that a boom in a given rms beta before
investment is followed by a bust upon investment only holds for average industry returns in
less concentrated industries.
D Industrial cross sectional variance in expected returns
While both Hou and Robinson (2006) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) focus on the relation
between average industry returns and industry concentration, this model predicts that the
relation between industry returns and concentration also extends to second order moments.
The rst prediction on second order moments is that the current cross sectional variance
of expected returns of an industry has predictability over its future investment dynamics.
Note that before all rms invest, j;0 reects the ability of rm j to invest earlier than
its competitors; rms with a higher j;0 can invest earlier and more. When 
s
;0 is high,
rms invest sequentially, concentration is high. Conversely, when c;0 is low, rms invest
simultaneously, concentration is low. Hence industries with high cross sectional variance in
expected returns become highly concentrated. Figure 5 illustrates this result numerically.43
41Conversely, using value weighted averages, the sign of s;t at x
s
L is negative, whereas the sign of 
s
;t
at xsF is positive. Hence industry e¤ects are driven by the changes in the beta of the more valuable rm L.
42Notably, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) state that their results are consistent with multiple rms in the
same industry making investment decisions based on a "common industry signal". In the context of the
model, such "signal" is the common investment threshold xc.
43Alexander and Thistle (1999) provide supporting evidence on this result.
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The model also provides the analog implications of the ndings by Hoberg and Phillips
(2010) and Hou and Robinson (2006) for second order moments. Consider rst the im-
plications on the predictability of ;t over time. In contrast with the ndings by Hoberg
and Phillips (2010) on rst order moments, the model predicts that the booms and busts in
;t are observable for the econometrician irrespective of the industry concentration. In all
industries, the cross sectional variance in betas ;t increases when rmsgrowth options be-
come more in the money, and decreases when rms exercise their options. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.
Consider now the comparison between s;t and 
c
;t at any point in time. Denote 
c
t st
the di¤erence in the cross sectional dispersion in returns between less and more concentrated
industries. In contrast with the ndings by Hou and Robinson (2006) for average industry
returns, Figure 3 shows that ct st is strictly negative at any point in time. This is because
more concentrated industries have rms with more heterogenous production technologies.
Proposition 6 ;t is mechanically related to industry concentration such that:
 industries become less (more) concentrated when ;0 is low (high);
 booms and busts in ;t are easily detectable irrespective of industry concentration;
 more concentrated industries have higher ;t than less concentrated industries.
IV Comparative statics
For the sake of tractability, Sections I-III keep all exogenous parameters related to the
organization of the industry constant, with the exception of c. This section complements
the analysis as it shows how demand growth , demand volatility , demand elasticity ",
and the number of rms N a¤ect industry dynamics. The comparative statics of the model
are consistent with several empirical and theoretical ndings in the literature. The main
results on industry dynamics in Sections I-III also hold when less and more concentrated
industries di¤er in more dimensions than c.
A Demand growth, volatility and elasticity
An important feature of the model is that demand shocks follow a di¤usion process with
drift  and volatility . This already suggests that both demand growth and demand
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volatility a¤ect industry dynamics. The model shows that rm L is more likely to choose
simultaneous investment if either demand growth  or demand volatility  are su¢ ciently
high. This implies that c is increasing in  and  and is illustrated in Figure 6.
The result that rms invest simultaneously in industries with high  and high  is con-
sistent with the industrial organization literature on tacit collusion. Ivaldi et al (2003)
suggest that for a xed number of rms tacit collusion is easier to sustain in growing mar-
kets, in which current prots are low relative to future prots. Boyer et al (2001) suggest
that demand uncertainty induces coordination as it boosts the growth option value for both
rms.
The corresponding asset pricing implication is that industries with high demand growth
and high demand volatility are more likely to be less concentrated (Figure 6), have more
pronounced booms and busts (Figure 7), and have low cross sectional variance in returns
(Figure 8). Furthermore, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) provide complementary evidence that
the industrial booms and busts are more pronounced in less concentrated industries with
high demand growth and high demand uncertainty. The lower panel in Figure 7 illustrates
the same result in the context of the model. Given that both  and  boost the expected
returns of all rms before investment, the decrease in average industry betas
c;t upon
investment is increasing in  and :
Demand elasticity also a¤ects industry dynamics. When demand elasticity is relatively
low such that " < ", the model predicts that rm L faces a higher shadow cost of preemption
and allows simultaneous investment. This is illustrated in Figure 6 and implies that c is
decreasing in ".44 The corresponding testable implication is that those industries with low
demand elasticity are less concentrated (Figure 6), have more pronounced booms and busts
(Figure 7), and have low cross sectional variance in returns (Figure 8). Furthermore, Figure
7 illustrates how booms and busts are particularly more pronounced in industries with lower
demand elasticity. Since a decrease in demand elasticity increases the level of market prices,
it boosts rmsexpected returns before investment.
Proposition 7 Industries with high demand growth , high demand volatility  and low
demand elasticity " are more likely to be less concentrated, have more pronounced booms and
busts in industry returns, and have lower cross sectional variance in returns.
44The works by Ivaldi et al (2003) and Motta (2004) on tacit collusion provide a similar prediction.
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B Competition and preemption
When applied to the more general case of an industry with N rms, the proposed framework
in this paper characterizes the joint e¤ects of c and N on investment timing and capacity
choice. Tables I-II show that an increase in the number of rms N erodes the growth option
value of all rms in the industry. This is in line with Grenadier (2002), and the empirical
evidence in Bulan, Mayer and Somerville (2009). The paper is also in line with Aguerre-
vere (2009) who observes that a higher number of rms erodes rmsbetas in imperfectly
competitive industries.
In contrast with the symmetric oligopolies in Grenadier (2002) and Aguerrevere (2009),
however, competition does not erode the values and the betas of all rms evenly. When
rms have di¤erent production technologies, an increase in N a¤ects more severely the betas
of those rms with less e¢ cient growth options for any strategy  j. In Tables I-II, rms
values and rmsbetas decrease more signicantly for rm F . This is consistent with Bulan
(2005), who observes empirically that larger rms with more market power better preserve
their growth option value.
The model also discriminates between e¤ects of preemption and competition on rms
option exercise strategies. The model shows that preemption and competition erode the
value and betas of all rms. This is illustrated in Tables I-II. The model also shows that
preemption and competition may have opposite e¤ects on rmsoptimal investment timing.
In both Grenadier (2002) and the simultaneous equilibrium in this paper, an increase in N
gives all rms an incentive to accelerate investment. Meanwhile, in sequential equilibria,
an increase in the shadow cost of preemption  > 0 gives followers (leaders) an incentive to
delay (accelerate) investment instead.
The model also predicts that a higher number of competitors induces all rms in the
same industry to accelerate investment if c is su¢ ciently low, but not necessarily otherwise.
This is illustrated in Tables I-II. When rms invest sequentially, an increase in N may
also magnify the e¤ects of preemption- leaders may behave more aggressively with a larger
number of followers, such that it takes longer until all rms exercise their growth options.45
Proposition 8 In asymmetric oligopolies, preemption and competition erode the returns of
all rms, a¤ect more severely the returns of those rms with less valuable growth opportuni-
ties, and may have opposite e¤ects on rmsincentives to accelerate investment.
45The shadow cost of preemption for rm L is higher in Table II than in Table I.
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C Robustness checks
The comparative statics described so far characterize less concentrated industries as indus-
tries with more homogeneous technologies (low c), high demand growth (high ), high
demand uncertainty (high ), low market power (low "), and a large number of rms (high
N). Conversely, the model relates more concentrated industries to industries with highly
heterogeneous technologies (high c), low demand growth (low ), low demand uncertainty
(low ), high market power (high "), and a low number of rms (low N). These results are
all consistent with the industrial organization literature on imperfect competition.46
A reasonable concern is yet whether the mechanical relation between the industry return
moment conditions and industry concentration derived in Section VI still remains when less
and more concentrated industries di¤er not only in c but also in all of these dimensions.
Consider rst the comparative statics with respect to ,  and ". Since rmsreturns co-
move more positively in less concentrated industries (Figure 7), irrespective of parameter
choice booms and busts in ;t are more pronounced in less concentrated industries and are
always detectable in ;t (Figure 8).
Consider now the comparison between less concentrated industries with high N , and
more concentrated industries with low N . If the only di¤erence between these industries
were given by the number of rms N , the model would not rationalize the evidence in Hou
and Robinson (2009) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010). As shown in Aguerrevere (2009)
and Tables II-III, all else equal an industry with higher N has lower returns on average.
Furthermore, for a given c in both industries, the intra-industry co-movement in rms
betas is the same, and booms and busts in industry returns are equally detectable.
As a consequence, the robustness check when industries di¤er on N compares an industry
with low N and high c with an industry with high N and low c. Figure 9 illustrates the
premium c;t   s;t between a less concentrated industry with high N and c  0+ and a
more concentrated industry withN = 2 and c > c. AsN increases in the less concentrated
industry, the equally weighted premium decreases but is strictly positive until Xt = xc. The
value weighted premium is also strictly positive until all rms in both industries exercise
their growth options. The predictions on co-movement remain the same.
Proposition 9 Less concentrated industries with low c, high , high , and high N have
lower cross sectional variance in returns, more positive co-movement in rmsreturns, more
46See, for instance, Tirole (1988) and Motta (2004).
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pronounced booms and busts, and higher returns on average than more concentrated industries
with high c, low , low , and low N:
V Conclusion
This paper proposes an alternative real options approach that fully endogeneizes the ordering
of investment decisions in oligopolies, and characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of rms
expected returns under imperfect competition. The model considers asymmetries in rms
production technologies and multiple rms. Firms optimize both on investment timing and
capacity. The solution approach quanties the costs of preemption, and predicts mutually
exclusive equilibria depending on the organization of the industry. The model proves that the
mechanical relation between the rmsexpected returns and industry concentration depends
on the underlying distribution of rmsproduction technologies.
The model demonstrates that an industrys mean and the cross sectional variance of ex-
pected returns depend mechanically on rmsLerner indexes, rmscurrent market shares,
and rmsrelative growth opportunities. When rms have similar production technologies,
the cross sectional variation in expected returns is low, rms invest simultaneously, rms
returns co-move positively, and the industry concentration upon investment is low. When
rms have more heterogeneous production technologies, the cross sectional variation in ex-
pected returns is high, rms invest sequentially, rmsreturns co-move less positively, and
the industry concentration upon investment is high. The predicted relation between ex-
pected returns, investment and industry concentration rationalizes several empirical facts,
including: (i) that rmsreturns co-move more positively in less concentrated industries;
(ii) that booms and busts in industry returns are more pronounced in less concentrated
industries; and (iii) that less concentrated industries earn higher returns on average.
The more general conclusion to extract from this paper is yet that an industrial organi-
zation model with asset pricing implications can rationalize several empirical ndings in the
nance literature, whose approach rarely elaborates on the impact of industrial organization
on rmsexpected returns. Alternatively, the asset pricing implications of the investment
model in this paper provide an alternative mechanism to test the predictions of dynamic
games of strategic interaction, which are regularly discussed as economic theories and yet
are hardly testable as such. The framework can be extended in many ways.
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Table I: Industry equilibrium when N = 2
Benchmark Sequential Simultaneous
Stackelberg Investment Investment
(a) (b) (c)
L F L F L F
Strategies
xj 0.032 0.125 0.019 0.655 0.090 0.090
qj 98.884 50.887 162.074 25.684 64.415 60.962
 0.000 0.000 0.939 0.000 0.000 0.000
Valuation at X0
Assets in Place 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258
Firm Value 0.585 0.202 0.270 0.060 0.433 0.395
j;0 -0.405 -0.169 -0.119 -0.205 0.000 0.000
Market at Xt = xsF
Q 149.771 149.771 187.758 187.758 125.377 125.377
qj=Q 0.660 0.340 0.863 0.137 0.514 0.486
HHI 0.551 0.551 0.764 0.764 0.501 0.501
FirmsBetas
At X0 1.176 0.923 1.021 0.012 1.129 1.112
At xsL 0.828 1.291 0.943 1.313 1.157 1.139
At xc 0.706 1.296 0.879 1.311 1.000 1.000
At xsF 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
This table illustrates the industry equilibrium when N = 2 and rms di¤er in their future production
technologies. Firm L behaves more aggressively an invests earlier and more in the sequential equilibrium
relative to Stackelberg games when c < c. The market share of rm L is the highest and market
concentration the highest in the sequential equilibrium. The value and the expected return of rm F are
always higher under simultaneous investment. In the sequential equilibrium, sF;t is lower than one before
rm L invests since it expects a reduction in market prices at Xt = xsL: Similarly, 
s
L;t is lower than one
upon investment since it expects a reduction in market prices at Xt = xsF :
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Table II: Industry equilibrium when N = 3
Sequential Simultaneous
Investment Investment
(a) (b)
L F M L F M
Strategies and Valuation
xj 0.014 0.093 0.801 0.212 0.212 0.212
qj 113.296 46.812 21.051 56.213 51.010 45.806
 0.959 0.920 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
HHI 1.000 0.586 0.471 0.336 0.336 0.336
Firm Value at X0 0.237 0.069 0.033 0.257 0.233 0.211
FirmsBetas
At X0 1.035 0.360 -0.603 1.063 1.038 1.009
At xsL 0.835 1.058 -2.900 1.083 1.051 1.013
At xsF 0.927 0.916 1.309 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table III: Other investment strategies when N = 3
Mixed Cases
L leads, F and M follow L and F lead, M follows
L F M L F M
Strategies and Valuation
xj 0.023 1.113 1.113 0.092 0.092 0.447
qj 159.453 19.192 12.740 120.414 34.965 22.792
 0.918 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.702 0.000
HHI 0.699 0.018 0.018 0.429 0.429 0.081
Firm Value at X0 0.314 0.054 0.049 0.338 0.216 0.126
FirmsBetas
At X0 1.107 0.134 0.021 1.122 1.007 0.809
At xsL 0.942 1.013 1.004 0.974 0.997 1.060
At xsF 1.000 1.000 1.000
These tables illustrate the potential equilibrium outcomes with N = 3 when rms have the same pa-
rameters as those in Table I. All else equal, competition erodes rm values and betas for all rms.  is
higher for rm L than form rm F , and also higher than in Table I. Firm L would maximize its value
by becoming a leader with two followers. However, this is not an equilibrium outcome since rm F only
invests simultaneously if rm L invests simultaneously as well. The equilibrium outcome is the simultaneous
equilibrium in Table II.
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Figure 1: The e¤ect of c on rmsinvestment strategies
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This gure illustrates the predictions on Proposition 2 of how c a¤ects rmsinvestment strategies in
equilibrium. The red (resp. blue) color relates to  sj (resp.  
c
j). The black dotted line reects rms
investment strategies in equilibrium. Firm L is more valuable under  cj when c < c, and is more valuable
under  sj otherwise. The threshold c obtains when rm L is indi¤erent between  
s
j and  
c
j . Firm F is
always more valuable under  cj . The shadow cost of preemption  decreases with c. The HHI increases
with c:
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Figure 2: The dynamics of jt in less and more concentrated industries
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This gure shows the dynamics of jt for c = c. The red lines relate to sequential investment. The
solid line corresponds to rm L and the dashed line to rm F: The blue lines depict jt for rms L and
F under simultaneous investment. Firmsbetas co-move positively (negatively) in less (more) concentrated
industries.
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Figure 3: Industry expected returns over time
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This gure illustrates the dynamics of ;t and ;t in less and more concentrated industries when
c = c. The solid red (blue) line shows the return moment conditions under sequential (simultaneous)
investment when using equally weighted industry returns. The dashed red (blue) line shows the return
moment conditions using value weighted industry returns. The solid black line shows the premium c;t s;t
and also c;t   s;t using equal weights. The dashed black line shows the corresponding series using value
weights. Using value weights, c;t s;t is strictly positive at any time. Using equal weights, c;t s;t is
always positive until all rms invest in the less concentrated industry. c;t   s;t is always negative using
any type of weights.
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Figure 4: Changes in average industry betas ;t
upon additions to industry capacity
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This gure illustrates why booms and busts in industry returns are more easily observable in less con-
centrated industries. In less concentrated industries, rmsreturns co-move more positively, and industry
returns decrease when rms adds capacity to the industry. In more concentrated industries, the expected
returns of leaders and followers co-move negatively. As a result, the equally or value weighted average
industry returns may increase or decrease when the industry capacity increases.
Figure 5: ;0 and industry concentration
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This gures shows that industries with high ;0 become highly concentrated upon investment. The red
(blue) color relates to the more concentrated industries in which rms invest sequentially (simultaneously).
The positive correlation between ;0 and the HHI holds for any level of c.
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Figure 6: The e¤ect of market demand on industry equilibria
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This gure illustrates how the underlying determinants of market demand a¤ect rmsinvestment strate-
gies in equilibrium. The red (blue) color relates to the sequential (simultaneous) investment strategies. The
black dotted line reects the investment strategies in equilibrium. Firm L prefers simultaneous investment
in more homogeneous industries with low ", high  and high . This explains why c is decreasing in " and
increasing in  and :
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Figure 7: Comparative statics for discrete changes in betas upon investment
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This gure illustrates j when rms invest in less and more concentrated industries. The dotted
(dashed) lines correspond to rm L (F ). The solid lines correspond to the equally weighted average industry
returns. In more homogeneous industries, rmsbetas and the average industry beta increase up to xc and
decrease sharply upon investment. This sharp decrease upon investment is larger in industries with low ",
high  and high . In more heterogeneous industries, sL and 
s
F have opposite signs both at x
s
L and
xsF , and hence booms and busts are not easily detectable at the industry level irrespective of ",  or :
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Figure 8: Comparative statics on ;t
;t when c < c ;t when c > c c;t   s;t
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This gure illustrates the cross sectional variation in industry betas when less (more) concentrated
industries have lower (higher) ", and higher (lower)  and . The dashed lines correspond to the base case
for c = c: The solid lines correspond to the case in which the industry has the indicated parameter either
10% lower or higher relative to the dashed line. The premium c;t   s;t is strictly negative irrespective of
parameter choice.
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Figure 9: The premium c;t   s;t
when industries di¤er in c and N
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This gure compares the equally weighted (solid line) and value weighted (dashed line) average industry
returns of a more concentrated industry with N = 2 and c > c and a less concentrated industry with high
N and c  0+: As N increases in the less concentrated industry, the equally weighted premium c;t s;t
decreases but remains strictly positive until all rms invest in the less concentrated industry.
A Appendix
A Sorting conditions when q
j
= q and cL < cF
The strategy pursued by rms is a multiple-action pair such that  j = fxj ; qjg: The proof follows
Bustamante (2011) and consists of two steps. The rst step is to show that if the value function Vj (Xt)
complies the conditions in Cho and Sobel (1990), then the sorting condition of the action pair  j corresponds
to the sorting conditions of each action in isolation. The second step is to derive the sorting conditions for
each action. I rst consider the case of N = 2. The value function Vj (Xt) rm j given the set of actions
 j is such that
Vj (Xt) = bD  qXt q

+
h bD (qj)  cjxj qj

  I   bD  qxj q

iXt
xj
v
(23)
where the xj and qj may take any value given xj > 0 and qj > 0: The function bD (qj)xj is the expected
present value of the demand prices (1) of rm j when its capacity is qj .
In line with Cho and Sobel (1990), Vj (Xt) is continuous in Sj and for any type j: The value function
Vj (Xt) is increasing in bD (qj)xj for any type j: Finally, if xL < xF and qL > qF ; then it must be the case
that VF (Xt)  eVF (Xt) implies VL (Xt) > eVL (Xt). This last condition ensures that if rm F has incentives
to deviate, rm L will pay a cost to ensure incentive compatibility. Replacing Vj (Xt) by (23) and operating,
the condition VF (Xt)  eVF (Xt) implies cF  
c where 
c is given by

c =
bD (qL) qL    bD (qF ) qF + bD  q q (1  )  F  x 1L   x 1F 
(qL   qF )
40
Similarly, the condition VL (Xt) > eVL (X1) implies cL  
c: Therefore if cL < cF and cF  
c; it holds that
cL < 
c for any parameter value.
Consider now the sorting condition for each action xj and qj separately. The sorting condition for xj
reects that, all else equal, more e¢ cient rms nd it less costly to invest earlier, namely
@
@cj

@Vj
@xj

=   (1  v) qj


Xt
xj
v
> 0 (24)
The sorting condition with respect to qj is such that, all else equal, more e¢ cient rms nd it less
costly to invest more in capacity, namely
@
@cj

@Vj
@qj

=  xj


Xt
xj
v
< 0 (25)
Conditions (24) and (25) ensure that the incentive compatibility constraint of the follower is binding and
that there exists an incentive compatible sequential equilibrium for the duopoly game.
The general case with N > 2 is proved similarly. The su¢ ciency conditions for Cho and Sobel (1990)
apply for games with N types, and all conditions above hold when cL < ::: < cj < ::::cN :
B Sequential investment strategies
Given that rm L has already invested, the problem faced by rm F is to maximize
rV sF = X
@V sF
@X
+
2
2
X2
@2V sF
@X2
+
h 
2q
  1"   ci qXt (26)
subject to the conditions
V F jXt=xsF =
1

h
xFQ
  1" qF   xF cF qF
i
  I (27)
@V F
@Xt

Xt=xsF
=
1

h
Q 
1
" qF   cF qF
i
(28)
@V F
@qF

Xt=xsF
= 0 (29)
where (26) equates the required rate of return of the rm to the expected return on the option to invest v is
the positive root of (26). Furthermore, (27) requires that the value of rm before investment equals, upon
option exercise, the gross prot that the manager extracts from investment net of operating costs and the
xed cost of investment I; (28) ensures that the option to invest is exercised along the optimal path; and
(29) requires that qF maximizes rm value. The strategy that solves (27)-(29) yields (12)-(13).
Since rm F has to ensure sequential investment, rm F maximizes
rV sL = X
@V sL
@X
+
2
2
X2
@2V sL
@X2
+
h 
qsL + q
  1"   ci qXt (30)
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subject to the alternative conditions
V sL jXt=xsL =
1

h
(1  s) q  1"L + sQ 
1
"   cL
i
xLqL   I   
hfV sF   V sF i (31)
@V sL
@Xt

Xt=xsL
=
1

h
(1  vs) q  1"L + vsQ 
1
"   cL
i
qL   
"
@fV sF
@xL
  @V
s
F
@xL
#
(32)
@V sL
@qL

Xt=xsL
= 0 (33)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of (14) and conditions (31)-(32) for rm L have similar interpretations
to those of rm F in (27)-(28). The strategy that solves (31)-(33) is given by (15)-(16). The parameter
v > 1 is the root of the ODEs in (26) and (30) and is the same for both rms L and rm F .
C Simultaneous investment strategies
As in Fundenberg and Tirole (1985) and Weeds (2002), a simultaneous equilibrium exists when both rms
are better o¤ by investing simultaneously. In this model, simultaneous investment is Pareto optimal for
both rms when rm L attains a higher value under simultaneous investment. To show this, consider two
alternative strategies   = fx; qg and   = fx; qg for any rm j such that x < x and q > q.   corresponds to
any sequential equilibrium in which the rm invests earlier and more than under simultaneous investment.
  corresponds to any simultaneous equilibrium in which the rm invests later and less than as a leader.
The condition that rm L attains a higher value by investing simultaneously with its competitor requires
VL (Xt;S) < VL
 
Xt;S

. Reordering terms, this implies cL >  where  is given by
 =
1
 [(1  ) p+ bp] q   hI + h 2q  1"   ci q xc i 1   xxv
xq   xq  xxv
Therefore if cL >  and cL < cF ; it holds that cF >  for any parameter value. The equilibrium investment
timing xc maximizes the value of rm L and is solved as in Dixit and Pyndick (1994). The optimal capacity
choice of both rms is solved as in Cournot games.
D Competition in both q
j
and cj
Consider rst the special case in which cL = cF and qL< qF such that rm type is given by the initial
installed capacity of rms q
j
. The total capacity once the growth option is exercised relates to the initial
capacity since qj = qj + qj : The value function Vj (Xt) rm j given the set of actions  j yields
Vj (Xt) = bD qj qjXt +
 bD (qj)  bD qj qjqj   c

1

xjqj   F

Xt
xj
v
(34)
In line with Cho and Sobel (1990), the framework requires that leaders have incentives to pay a cost to
induce incentive compatibility when followers nd it protable to deviate. If xL < xF and qL > qF ; then
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VF (Xt)  eVF (Xt) should imply VL (Xt) > eVL (Xt). Using (34), the condition VF (Xt)  eVF (Xt) implies
q
F
 
q where 
q is given by

q =
bD (qL) qL    bD (qF ) qF   c (qL   qF )  F  x 1L   x 1F bD q
L

(1  )
Similarly, VL (Xt) > eVL (X1) implies qL  
q: Hence if qL < qF and qF  
q; qL < 
q for any parameter
value.
The sorting conditions for xj and qj reect that, all else equal, rms with larger installed capacity nd
it more costly to invest earlier and more, namely
@
@q
j
h
@Vj
@xj
i
> 0 and @@q
j
h
@Vj
@qj
i
< 0 (35)
where the rationale behind (35) resembles that in Boyer et al (2001). Whenever rms are already operating
and one of them invests, an increase in capacity reduces market prices and hence the instantaneous prots
for both rms. Since both rms have the same growth opportunities, the expected reduction in prots is
less pronounced for the rm with lower installed capacity.
The joint implication of (10) and (35) is then that rms with lower current installed capacity q
j
and
lower future production costs cj have a comparative advantage to invest earlier and more. The sorting
conditions when rm type is given by the pair
n
q
j
; cj
o
are given by
@
@cj
h
@Vj
@xj
i
+ @@q
j
h
@Vj
@xj
i
> 0; @@cj
h
@Vj
@qj
i
+ @@q
j
h
@Vj
@qj
i
< 0 (36)
The su¢ ciency conditions described for N = 2 also apply for N > 2. The methodology to solve for rms
investment strategies in equilibrium is the same as in the case of q
j
= q and cL < cF .
E The low concentration premium
This is the proof that the value weighted premium c;t s;t > 0 for Xt 2 [X0; xsF ): Given (6), it is possible
to show that
c;t   s;t = (v   1)
0BB@
P
j
sjt
P
j
V sjt
 
P
j
cjt
P
j
V cjt
1CCA (37)
Since the second term in brackets in (37) is always lower or equal to one under simultaneous investment for
Xt  xsF , the proof that c;t s;t consists in showing that the rst term in brackets in (37) is always higher
than one for Xt  xsF . Consider rst the interval Xt 2 (xsL; xsF ) : Using the results in the paper, the rst
term in brackets in (37) equals
I
v   1

Xt
xsF
v
+
+Lt

< 0 (38)
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Denote ssL  q
s
L
Qs the market share of rm L when both rms have invested. Using the denition of q
s
F in
(13) and given ssL  q
s
F
Qs , a su¢ cient condition such that (38) holds is"
1
"
(1  ssL)2  

ssL +
q
F
Qs
  1"
(1  ssL)
#
<
"
ssL +
q
F
Qs
  1"
  1
#
ssLv
Reordering terms, 
ssL +
q
F
Qs
 1
"

1
"
(1  ssL)2 + ssLv

< 1 + (v   1) ssL (39)
which is true for any choice of parameter choice since the left hand side of (39) is lower than one. This is
because ssL < 1 and each of the factors on the left hand side of (41) lower than one, since
ssL +
q
F
Qs < 1 and s
s
L > 0 > 1  v"
where v > 1 and " > 1: Hence c;t   s;t > 0 is always true for Xt 2 (xsL; xsF ).
Consider next the interval Xt 2 [X0; xsL]. Using the results in the paper, the expression above equals
I
v   1

Xt
xsF
v
+
+Lt

+
I
v   1

Xt
xsL
v
+
 Ft

< 0 (40)
Since (38) proves that the rst two terms in (40) are negative, a su¢ cient condition for (40) to hold is that
the sum of the second two terms is also negative. Denote ssF 
q
F
q
F
+qsL
the market share of rm F during
Xt 2 (xsL; xsF ). Using the fact that qsL > qcL, a su¢ cient condition such that the second two terms in (40)
are negative is then241
"
(1  ssF )2  
 
q
F
+ q
L
q
F
+ qsL
!  1"
(1  ssF )
35 <
24 qF + qL
q
F
+ qsL
!  1"
  1
35 vssF
Reordering terms,  
q
F
+ q
L
q
F
+ qsL
! 1
" 
1
"
(1  ssF )2 + ssF v

< 1 + (v   1) ssL (41)
where, once again, ssF < 1 and both terms on the right hand side of (41) are strictly lower than one.
F Parameter choice in numerical examples
The parameters in Tables I-III are r = 65%,  = 2:5%;  = 25%, " = 2:35, I = 1, X0 = 0:01; cL = 0:1;
cF = cL + c; c = 0:1105; q = 1 and c = 0:00175: The technology of rm M is such that cM = cL + 2  c:
The parameters in Figures 1  9 are the same with exception of c = 0:0077.
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G The case of N rms
The solution approach for the case of N rms is similar to the duopoly case. Each rm cares about its
closest (and strongest) competitor. As in (11), the working assumption is that each rm has incentives to
imitate its closest and stronger competitor. The framework further assumes that each rm has no incentives
to imitate other stronger competitors.
The sorting conditions (36) facilitate the solution of sequential equilibria for any number of rms. The
sorting conditions constrain the possible equilibrium outcomes to those in which the rm with the more
e¢ cient growth option invests rst. The only binding incentive compatibility constraint for each rm is
that of its strongest competitor.
Tables II-III illustrate the equilibria that may arise in pure strategies when N = 3. Firms may invest
sequentially or simultaneously as in the case of N = 2, but there also other two equilibria in which two of the
three rms cluster and the remaining rm either leads or follows. Using the same underlying parameters as
in Table I, the equilibrium outcome for N = 3 in Tables II-III is that rms invest simultaneously.
The example for N = 3 in Tables II-III highlights the two important features of the model when N > 2:
First, c is itself a function of N , and may either decrease or increase if the distribution of rmsproduction
technologies is not uniform. In the example, c is the same as in the case of N = 2: all rms are equally
distant competitors. Second, the equilibrium outcome for N > 2 depends on the incentives of both rm L
and F to invest earlier than their closest competitor. Firm L would be better o¤ having M as a follower
(Table III), but rm F is better o¤ investing simultaneously with M (Table II).
45
